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NOTES
Corporate Law-THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IMPOSES
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS ON CORPORATE DIRECTORS-Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
In a decision that elicited intense criticism from the nation's
boardrooms, the Delaware Supreme Court recently limited the pro-
tection available to corporate directors under the Business Judg-
ment Rule. In Smith v. Van Gorkom' (the Trans Union Case) the
court reversed the Delaware Court of Chancery and found the di-
rectors of Trans Union Corporation personally liable to the corpo-
-ration's shareholders for breaching the duty of reasonable care.
The purpose of this Note is to review the Business Judgment Rule,
analyze the court's opinion in the Trans Union Case, and assess
the criticism the decision has generated.
I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The Business Judgment Rule is a judicially developed principle
of corporate governance that has evolved into a fundamental part
of American corporate law over the last 150 years.2 Although
courts and commentators have articulated a variety of formula-
tions of the rule, defensive use of the Business Judgment Rule has
developed largely for two reasons:$ first, to protect officers and di-
rectors from personal liability for misjudgments made in the good
faith performance of their corporate duties," and second, out of
recognition that judges are not business experts qualified to evalu-
ate complex commercial transactions.3 The rule thus operates to
1. 488 A.2d 858, 864, 893 (Del. 1985).
2. Cf. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 93 (1979). It
appears the Business Judgment Rule originated in 1829. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart.
(n.s.) 68 (La. 1829); Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847).
3. See Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Ac-
tions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 32 (1981); Veasey & Manning, Codified Stan-
dard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef?, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980); Arsht & Hinsey, Codified
•Standard-Same Harbor but Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 (1980).
4. Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 32.
5. Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 33; Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654,
659 (Del. Ch. 1928) (questions of corporate policy and business management are best re-
solved outside of courtrooms).
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limit the scope of judicial review regarding the merits of most busi-
ness decisions.'
Under the Business Judgment Rule, directors are presumed to
have acted with loyalty, good faith, and due care in their decision-
making functions. The Business Judgment Rule does not preclude
judicial inquiry into corporate decision-making in all cases, how-
ever. The good faith presumption may be rebutted by evidence of
fraud8 or actions compromising a director's duty of care or loyalty.9
Judicial inquiry into the scope of a director's duty of care is lim-
ited to determining whether he made a reasonable effort to obtain
all necessary information for a particular decision. 10 The Business
Judgment Rule protects the director only when the challenged de-
cision was based on adequate information.11 The court will not
evaluate the relative weight accorded various potential alternatives
so long as the information was obtained and available for
consideration.12
The Business Judgment Rule may also be invoked when a direc-
tor's duty of loyalty is questioned. 13 For a director to avail himself
of the rule's protection requires that his actions be motivated by a
desire to benefit the corporation. 14 Alternatively, concomitant indi-
vidual and corporate gain will not render the Business Judgment
Rule inapplicable if a good faith corporate purpose also exists.15
However, where a director has a substantial personal interest in a
corporate transaction, the presumption of loyalty ceases. 16 If per-
sonal interest is shown, the director must demonstrate that the
transaction is intrinsically fair to the corporation. 17
6. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979). The Business Judg-
ment Rule "bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and
in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate
purposes." Id.; Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
7. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981); Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
8. See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), affd per curiam, 316 A.2d
619 (Del. 1974).
9. Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 999-1000; Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720.
10. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320, 323-4 (Del. Ch. 1979).
11. Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 396 (Del. Ch. 1961).
12. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013-14 (D.C. 1974).
13. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
14. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
15. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
16. See Arsht, supra note 2, at 115; Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
17. Guth, 5 A.2d at 511; Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 386 (Del. Ch.
1979).
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Recognizing the opportunity for greater liability protection, cor-
porate directors have made offensive use of the Business Judgment
Rule to shield themselves from shareholder derivative suits."a Gen-
erally, offensive use of the rule is made by board appointment of
special litigation committees comprised of disinterested and inde-
pendent directors.' 9 These committees investigate allegations in
shareholder derivative suits and determine whether maintenance
of the action is in the best interests of the corporation.2 ° These
committees generally have the authority to dismiss the action upon
determination that the suit is contrary to the interests of the
corporation.21
Two viewpoints have emerged as to the propriety of special liti-
gation committees. The traditional approach, consistent with the
rationale of the Business Judgment Rule, accords great weight to
the decision of the disinterested directors and generally limits judi-
cial inquiry to evaluating the disinterested independence of com-
mittee members. A more revolutionary view, marking an erosion
of the Business Judgment Rule, recognizes that a so-called disin-
terested special litigation committee is actually a subset of the
board. Therefore, to some extent, the independent directors will
sympathize with their colleagues and, thus, not be truly disinter-
ested.2 3 More skeptical courts extend considerably less deference to
the decision of the committees.
The weight accorded special litigation committees' decisions,
and indeed the Business Judgment Rule in general, are issues of
state law. An individual state's resolution of these issues will effec-
tively determine the extent to which it becomes actively involved
in corporate governance. The Trans Union Case is significant be-
cause, given Delaware's status as one of the nation's leading corpo-
rate states, the Delaware Supreme Court's treatment of the Busi-
18. See Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 38.
19. This practice was introduced in Gall and discussed in Coffee & Schwartz, The Sur-
vival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 261, 271 (1981).
20. Gall, 418 F. Supp. at 514.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 996; Morris & Henry, The Aftermath of Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado: What Is Left of the Business Judgment Rule? 88 DICK. L. REV. 411, 417
(1984).
23. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981); Block & Prussin,
supra note 3, at 55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974), allows a board to delegate all of
its authority to a committee.
1986]
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ness Judgment Rule may have an influence felt far beyond that
state's borders.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trans Union's shareholders brought a class action against
Marmon Group, Inc., seeking rescission of a cash-out merger of
Trans Union into New T Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Marmon, which was controlled by the Pritzker family.24 In the al-
ternative, the shareholders sought damages against the Trans
Union directors personally.25 The Delaware Court of Chancery
summarily dismissed the suit, finding "(1) that the Board of Direc-
tors had acted in an informed manner so as to be entitled to pro-
tection [under the] business judgment rule . . . and (2) that the
shareholder vote approving the merger should not be set aside be-
cause the stockholders had been 'fairly informed' by the Board"
prior to the formal vote on the merger. 26 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the court of chancery, rejecting its factual and legal
conclusions. The directors were held personally liable for the fair
value of the shareholders' stock.27
Trans Union was a diversified, publicly traded holding company
with annual cash flows of hundreds of millions of dollars. 28 How-
ever, the company had accumulated substantial investment tax
credits and was unable to produce sufficient taxable income to take
advantage of them.29 As an alternative to Trans Union's practice of
offsetting its credits by acquiring small income-producing compa-
nies, Donald Romans, Chief Financial Officer of Trans Union, sug-
gested a leveraged buy out.30 He and Bruce Chelberg, President
and Chief Operating Officer of Trans Union, informed the Board
that they had performed a preliminary study by "running the
numbers" of a potential leveraged buy out at fifty and sixty dollars
per share. They found that it would be easy to work a deal at fifty
dollars but very difficult at sixty dollars." At this time, Jerome
Van Gorkom, Trans Union's Chairman and Chief Executive Of-
24. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863 (Del. 1985) [hereinafter cited as The Trans
Union Case]. A cash-out or leveraged buy out is typically a friendly merger arrangement
where the buyer uses the assets of the target corporation as collateral to finance the
purchase.
25. Id. at 863.
26. Id. at 864.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 865.
31. Id.
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ficer, stated that he would be willing to take fifty-five dollars for
his seventy-five thousand shares, but he vetoed a leveraged buy out
by management because of a potential conflict of interest.32
Intrigued by the prospect of a buy out, Van Gorkom unilaterally
decided to meet with corporate takeover specialist Jay Pritzker. 33
Van Gorkom presented to Pritzker a purchase proposal of fifty-five
dollars per share,34 purportedly reserving the right to accept a bet-
ter offer. Pritzker agreed, upon the condition that he be able to
purchase one million shares of Trans Union stock at market price.
If an "auction contest" developed and Trans Union sold to a
higher bidder, then the profit Pritzker would make on those shares
would be his fee for being a "stalking horse.""5 On Thursday, Sep-
tember 18, Pritzker tendered a cash-out merger offer of fifty-five
dollars a share but insisted the Trans Union Board act on the pro-
posal within three days.3 On Friday, September 19, Van Gorkom
retained James Brennan, an attorney, to advise Trans Union of the
legal aspects of the merger. Van Gorkom called a meeting of senior
management for Saturday, September 20, to be followed immedi-
ately by a special meeting of the Board. 37 The Pritzker offer was
received negatively at the senior management meeting. Romans,
the Chief Operating Officer, announced that he had done a second
study, finding the appropriate price range for a leveraged buy out
to be between fifty-five and sixty-five dollars.3 8 Van Gorkom
neither saw Romans' study nor requested that it be made available
for the Board meeting.39
32. Id. The court found it noteworthy that Van Gorkom, an officer of Trans Union for 24
years, its Chief Executive Officer for more than 17 years, and Chairman of the Board for 2
years, was approaching the mandatory retirement age of 65. Id. at 866.
33. Id.
34. Id. Prior to the meeting, Van Gorkom instructed Trans Union's controller, without
consulting the Board or senior management, "to calculate the feasibility of a leveraged buy-
out at an assumed price per share of $55." The record revealed no competent evidence that
$55 represented the per share intrinsic value of Trans Union. Id.
35. Id. Originally, Pritzker reserved the right to purchase 1,750,000 shares, but later ne-
gotiations settled on 1,000,000 shares.
36. Id. at 867.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 867-68. In fact Chelberg, and Peterson the controller, were the only officers to
support the proposal. Romans objected to the price as being too low and argued the propo-
sal was a "'lock-up' and amounted to 'an agreed merger as opposed to an offer."' He fur-
ther suggested that inadequate consideration was given to the tax consequences of a cash-
out deal on low-basis stockholders, and that the provisions of the agreement prohibiting bid
solicitations and the furnishing of inside information to other bidders would inhibit poten-
tial offers. Id.
39. Id. at 867-69. Attorney Brennan had a copy of the proposed merger agreement, but
1986]
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At the Board meeting, Van Gorkom gave a twenty-minute oral
presentation of the Pritzker proposal but failed to mention how
the fifty-five dollar purchase price had been reached."' Regarding
the fairness of the price, Van Gorkom took the position that a
ninety-day market test would validate the Board's approval of the
fifty-five dollar price. 41 At the end of the two-hour meeting, the
Board approved the agreement sight unseen, purportedly subject
to two exceptions to which Pritzker later agreed.42 Subsequently,
the company issued a press release announcing that both the
merger agreement and the Pritzker proposal would be submitted
for a shareholder vote if a better offer was not received prior to
February 1, 1981. 4 Solomon Brothers, retained by Trans Union to
solicit additional offers for the company, produced only one serious
customer, who later declined to make a final offer. On February
10, the merger agreement was approved by the shareholders. 45
III. ANALYSIS
The principal holding in the Trans Union Case was narrow. The
court held that the Board's September 20 decision approving the
proposed cash-out merger "was not the product of an informed
business judgment. '46 In so holding, the court found adequate evi-
copies were not available for the directors. However, as chief financial officer, Romans at-
tended the board meeting and informed the Board of his second study. Id.
40. Id. at 868. Van Gorkom never disclosed that he suggested the $55 price to Pritzker,
that it was not negotiated, or "the methodology by which he alone . . . arrived at the $55
figure." Id.
41. Id. Van Gorkom urged the Board to decide not whether $55 per share was the high-
est price the market would bear, but instead whether it was a fair price which should be
submitted to the shareholders for acceptence or rejection. The court noted, however, that "a
director may not abdicate that duty by leaving to the shareholders alone the decision to
approve or disapprove the agreement." Id. at 873. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974),
provides that directors must adopt a resolution which approves a detailed merger agreement
prior to the agreement being submitted to the shareholders.
42. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 869. The Board claimed to have made its accept-
ance of the agreement contingent on two items: that Trans Union would be free to accept
any better offer made while the market test was going on, and that Trans Union's proprie-
tary information could be shared with other bidders. These conditions were not reflected in
the Board's minutes. Id.
43. Id. at 870.
44. Id. at 870. General Electric Credit Corp. negotiated with Trans Union but refused to
make a final offer because of the existing merger agreement with Pritzker. Id.
45. Id. Some 69.9% of the outstanding shares were voted in favor of the merger, 7.25%
were voted against, and 22.85% were not voted. Id.
46. Id. at 864. The court further held that the Board's subsequent amendments of the
merger agreement and other attempted curative actions had no effect, and "that the Board
did not deal with complete candor with the stockholders by failing to disclose all material
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dence that the directors had not availed themselves of all the in-
formation reasonably necessary to make an informed decision.
Thus, the presumption of reasonable care was overcome.47
The court noted that there were no allegations of fraud, bad
faith, or self-dealing against the directors, and it therefore pre-
sumed the decision was made in good faith.'8 The directors' loyal-
ties were not in question; the case rested solely on the duty of care.
The court also affirmed the applicable standard of care: whether
the directors were grossly negligent in failing to reach an informed
decision.' 9
Initially, the Trans Union directors argued that their actions be-
tween September 20 and the shareholders' vote four months later
should be considered in determining whether an informed decision
had been made.50 The court rejected this post hoc approach and
instead evaluated the degree of information available to, and pos-
sessed by, the directors on September 20, the date of the actual
decision." In what appears to be an exceptionally accommodating
approach, the court examined the possible curative effects of the
directors' post-September 20 actions.5 2 To evaluate the level of in-
formation available after the actual decision had been made would
allow the fortuity of subsequent information or circumstances to
absolve the directors of an otherwise clear violation of their fiduci-
ary duty.
The directors argued that their decision was informed, based on
facts ... before securing the stockholders' approval of the merger." Id.
47. Id. at 893. "In the specific context of a proposed merger ... a director has the duty
under [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974)], along with his fellow directors, to act in an
informed and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement of merger
before submitting the proposal to the stockholders." Id. The court also held that the Board
failed to disclose to Trans Union's shareholders all material information which a reasonable
shareholder would deem necessary to consider when deciding on the Pritzker offer. Id. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974) is the Delaware long-form merger statute.
48. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 873. The court stated, however, that questions of
motive were irrelevant when examining directors' actions under a duty of care analysis. Id.
49. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court had recently held in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984), that the duty of care under the Business Judgment Rule is based upon
the standard of gross negligence.
50. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 873-74. During this period the Board, among
other actions, employed Salomon Brothers to solicit other offers and amended the merger
agreement so as to allow Trans Union to run a market test. Id. at 878. The Delaware Court
of Chancery had considered the actions taken during this four-month period between the
approval of the merger agreement and the shareholders' notification in determining that the
directors had reached an informed decision. Id. at 874.
51. Id. at 874.
52. Id. at 881.
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four factors: (1) the magnitude of the premium between the mar-
ket value of the stock and Pritzker's offer, (2) an amendment of
the September 20 agreement to allow a "market test" period, (3)
the collective experience and corporate sophistication of the
Board's directors, and (4) reliance on legal advice that rejection of
the proposal could lead to a suit against the directors.53 These rea-
sons were deemed insufficient to demonstrate that the Board's de-
cision was informed.
In addressing the first argument, the court acknowledged that a
premium paid for stock may be one reqson to recommend a merger
but, by itself, is insufficient to evaluate properly the fairness of an
offer.54 This was especially true in Trans Union's situation because
the Board was aware that the market had historically undervalued
Trans Union's stock.66 The Board stated in the proxy statement
that the common stock did not reflect the "inherent" value of the
company. 56 Thus, by its own admission, the Board thought it was
inappropriate to rely on the market price as an accurate indicator
of Trans Union's value.57 Yet with no other information designed
to value the corporation, the Board agreed to sell Trans Union.
Furthermore, it was not disputed that the price paid for publicly
traded stock is typically a measure of the value of a minority inter-
est in the corporation.58 The Board apparently did not take into
consideration the fact that the sale of an entire corporation or of a
controlling interest in one generally yields a greater value than the
cumulative price per share. 5e The court also rejected the directors'
assertions that they were protected under Delaware law because
they had relied in good faith on Van Gorkom's "report" to the
Board on the substance of the Pritzker proposal.6 0 Although "re-
53. Id. at 875.
54. Id. The market price of Trans Union stock on the date of the agreement was approx-
imately $38 per share. Thus, the offer by Pritzker constituted a premium of $17 per share.
Id.
55. Id. at 876.
56. Id. It was stated in the proxy statement that earnings were "excellent" but that this
would probably not be reflected in future stock prices because in the past the market price
had not reflected the inherent value of Trans Union. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 875. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1974), provides:
A member of the board of directors of any corporation organized under this
chapter. . . shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully protected in relying in
good faith upon the books of account or reports made to the corporation by any of
its officers . . . or in relying in good faith upon other records of the corporation.
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port" under the Delaware Code has been liberally construed to in-
clude presentations by corporate officers,"1 the court found Van
Gorkom to have been uninformed about the basic provisions "of
the very document" he discussed. 2 Because the "report" was not
pertinent to the valuation of the corporation, the court character-
ized the directors' acceptance of Van Gorkom's presentation as
"blind reliance" rather than good faith.63 Had the directors made
reasonable inquiry of Van Gorkom, the inadequacy of the proposal
would have been apparent." In a portion of the opinion that has
received much criticism,65 the court noted that the directors did
not call for an outside valuation study or fairness opinion of Trans
Union.6 Although the court clearly stated that an outside valua-
tion study was not necessary, nor an investment banker's opinion
required, as a matter of law,67 the decision was hastily labeled an
"Investment Banker's Relief Act. '"68 Although the Trans Union
Board had Solomon Brothers on retainer, its merger and acquisi-
tion specialist, who was based in Chicago and familiar with Trans
Union's affairs, was not consulted. 9 The complete failure of the
Board to in any way objectively verify the fifty-five dollar price
offered by Pritzker compelled the court's finding that the Board's
decision was insufficiently informed to qualify for protection under
the Business Judgment Rule.
The Board's second argument suggested that the market test,
whereby Trans Union could receive other offers for a specified pe-
riod of time, was a condition of the September 20 agreement. The
Board contended that the decision was not impulsive or unin-
formed and that the marketplace conclusively established that the
price was reasonable. 70 However, the facts on record offered little
support for these arguments.71 Van Gorkom admitted having never
read the merger agreement and stated he was relying on his under-
61. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964).
62. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 875.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 875.
65. See infra note 106.
66. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 876.
67. See infra text accompanying note 117.
68. But see Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after
Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 3 (1985). "[I]t is an overstatement to consider the Van
Gorkom case as the Investment Bankers' Relief Act of 1985 .... " Id.
69. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 877-78.
70. Id. at 878.
71. Id. There was no showing that the merger agreement or any amendment to it per-
mitted a public auction with Trans Union going to the highest bidder. Id.
19861
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standing that corporate directors have an inherent right, based on
their fiduciary duty, to accept a better offer. 72 Van Gorkom further
conceded that the agreement barred Trans Union from actively
soliciting other offers or furnishing nonpublic information about
Trans Union to other interested parties.7 3 Although the sharehold-
ers requested that the directors produce the merger agreement for
evidentiary purposes, the directors, without explanation, failed to
do so. 74 Likewise, the directors failed to call James Brennan, Trans
Union's outside attorney, for verification of the agreement's
contents.
75
The Board's contention that the sale price was validated as rea-
sonable by the market was unpersuasive because the press release
issued by the Board on September 22 stated that Trans Union had
entered into "definitive agreements" with Pritzker and failed to
mention any right to accept higher offers. These factors would
have effectively precluded other offers. 78 Furthermore, the press re-
lease was accompanied by a public announcement that Pritzker
had been granted an option to purchase one million shares of
Trans Union, further diminishing potential interest in the
company.77
The Board's third and probably most persuasive argument was
that the collective experience and business sophistication of the di-
rectors warranted the conclusion that the decision to sell was in-
formed and reasonable. The court acknowledged the exceptional
backgrounds of the "inside" and "outside" directors of Trans
Union 78 but determined that the defendants' "unfounded reli-
ance" on the premium and market test undermined their argu-
ment.79 Notably, the court did not criticize the substantive deci-
sion made by the Board; rather the court found that the procedure
72. Id. at 879.
73. Id. at 878.
74. Id. The court stated that the defendants' failure to produce the original merger
agreement warranted the inference that the document authorized Trans Union to receive
competitive proposals. Id.
75. Id. at 879.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 879-80. Another corporation interested in purchasing Trans Union would have
to pay at least $17 million more because of the option given to Pritzker.
78. Id. at 880 n.21. The court noted in detail the impressive backgrounds of both the
"inside" and "outside" directors. The inside directors collectively had 116 years of employ-
ment with Trans Union and 68 years on the Board of Directors. The outside directors were
eminent businessmen with 50 years combined experience as directors of Trans Union. Id.
79. Id. at 880.
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used, or lack of procedure, precluded the board from reaching an
informed judgment.80
In their final argument, the directors contended that they relied
on their attorney's legal advice that Delaware law did not require a
fairness opinion or an outside valuation prior to sale.s" The court
acknowledged the correctness of the legal advice but found it irrel-
evant to the issue of whether the decision to sell was informed.8 2
The sole concern regarding the Business Judgment Rule was
whether the directors adequately informed themselves of the value
of Trans Union prior to their decision to sell the corporation.8 3
The Delaware Supreme Court found a complete lack of merit in
the justifications offered by the directors. The court held the direc-
tors personally liable for a breach of their fiduciary duty of reason-
able care. 4 Approval of the sale of a publicly held multimillion
dollar corporation based on an undocumented twenty-minute oral
presentation, in the absence of exigency cannot, in the most per-
missive interpretation of the fiduciary duty of care, be considered
an informed business decision.
IV. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISM
Criticism of the Trans Union Case has been largely premised
upon the misperception that the Delaware Supreme Court de-
parted from traditional Business Judgment Rule principles.8 " Al-
though the decision appears to be the first case turning "solely on
the basis of the Board's decision-making processes,"86 it is actually
a clarification of the existing due care requirement rather than an
erosion of the rule's protection.8 7 Considering the many inconsis-
tent formulations of the rule in prior case law, misconceptions sur-
80. Id. at 881; accord Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 599 (Del. Ch.), afl'd per
curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
81. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 880.
82. Id. at 881.
83. Id. The court agreed that outside valuation studies and fairness opinions were not
required by law; however, the court found that, in the absence of outside studies, the Board
did not have sufficient information as to the intrinsic value of Trans Union on which to base
an informed business judgment. Id.
84. Id. at 893.
85. See Schwartz & Wiles, Business Judgment Rule Clarified by Del.'s Trans Union
Decision, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1985, at 1, 42.
86. Id. at 44.
87. The Trans Union Case decision does not undermine Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), where the court stated that "directors are entitled to rely
on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on
suspicion."
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rounding the actual requirements of the Business Judgment Rule
are understandable."
Until recently, the focal point of the Business Judgment Rule
has been on the substantive fairness of directors' decisions.89 In
such determinations, the rule was assumed to attach with equal
force to all directors' decisions,90 thus limiting the court's inquiry
to whether the business judgment was so grossly negligent as to
warrant piercing the rule's considerable protection. In this context,
the rule and its underlying justifications are at their strongest."
However, when the focus is shifted to the procedural due care ex-
ercised by directors in acquiring the information necessary for an
informed decision, it appears the justifications for the rule are di-
minished.9 2 While it is, undoubtedly sound policy to provide pro-
tection from judicial second-guessing as to a board's substantive
decisions, it seems less defensible to protect boards when they fail
to use reasonable care in gathering all pertinent information prior
to decision-making. This rationale applies with even greater force
when the decision involves a fundamental change in the
corporation.
Acquiring information for business decisions is expensive.9 3 Nat-
urally, then, the amount invested in information should vary with
the importance and potential impact of the decision.94 A criticism
of the Trans Union Case, and of any decision going against those
seeking the protection of the Business Judgment Rule, is that the
court is substituting its determination of the adequacy of informa-
tion for that of more qualified professional directors.9 5 While this
concern is generally valid, fear of judicial second-guessing is not an
appropriate criticism of the Trans Union Case. Confronted with
competing interests of corporate autonomy and the state's respon-
88. Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 85, at 44.
89. Manning, supra note 68, at 4. "The Van Gorkom opinion can be fitted... into the
. ..business judgment rule jurisprudence, with its emphasis not on the merits of the deci-
sion made by the directors but on the process by which the decision was made." Id.
90. See Manning, supra note 68, at 5. "The literature on the business judgment rule
accords no significance to the character of the particular issue being decided by the direc-
tors. Judicial and law review discussions take it for granted that the business judgment rule
applies uniformly to all decisions by the board." Id.
91. It is in this area that directors' experience and business intuition should be given the
widest latitude.
92. In the gamble for profits, hindsight will demonstrate some decisions to be improvi-
dent; however, as a social policy the risk of loss becomes intolerably high when the gamble is
not based on adequate information.
93. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
1437, 1441 (1985).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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sibility for corporate governance, the court in the Trans Union
Case rendered a traditional Delaware business-friendly definition
of the Business Judgment Rule. 6 The rule provides an across-the-
board presumption that directors are fully informed prior to mak-
ing a decision; gross negligence is required to overcome that pre-
sumption.9 7 It is difficult to imagine how the court could have fash-
ioned a more promanagement formulation of the rule."' If the
Trans Union Case is open to any criticism from a rule-of-law
standpoint, it is that the decision is a continuation of Delaware's
"race to the bottom" corporate policy.19
Unfortunately, the egregious factual circumstances in the Trans
Union Case preclude safe prophecies about the willingness of Del-
aware courts to hold directors liable for inadequately informed de-
cisions. While the holding ostensibly provides a gross negligence
standard of review for directors' judgments, it also may demon-
strate a willingness to engage in heightened judicial scrutiny of de-
cisions involving fundamental corporate change. Just as the rela-
96. Delaware has been soundly criticized both judicially and legislatively for creating an
environment extremely favorable to corporations. See generally Cary, Federalism and Cor-
porate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
97. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 873.
98. Concern about the lack of uniformity in the State governance of corporations has led
to various proposals to federalize corporation law. Establishing the appropriate due care
requirement has been a major obstacle in these proposals. It appears, however, the standard
generally proposed is one of negligence as opposed to the gross negligence standard applied
in the Trans Union Case.
The American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project has articulated the following
formulation:
§ 4.01 Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the Business Judgment Rule.
(d) A director or officer does not violate his duty under this Section with respect
to the consequences of a business judgment if he:
(1) was informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent he reasonably believed to be appropriate under the circumstances; (2) was
not interested [§ 1.151 in the subject of the business judgment and made the judg-
ment in good faith; and (3) had a rational basis for believing that the business
judgment was in the best interests of the corporation.
A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECoMMENDATIONS, Tenative Draft
No. 3 (Apr. 13, 1984) (footnotes omitted).
The Model Business Corporation Act sets the following standard:
§ 8.30(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director including his duties
as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
99. See Cary, supra note 96, at 705.
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tive importance of managerial decisions justifies a sliding scale for
measuring the duty of information gathering, so the magnitude of
the potential effect of board decisions on the corporation may de-
termine the level of scrutiny the court will apply.100 In particular,
the more a decision affects the ownership interests of shareholders,
the more willing the court may be to scrutinize the decision. 1'01 A
decision to liquidate shareholders' ownership interests, such as
that made by the board in the Trans Union Case, should require
the highest level of predecision information and receive a commen-
surate level of scrutiny.
The Delaware Supreme Court also has been criticized for its fac-
tual findings in the Trans Union Case.10 2 Rejection of the court of
chancery's findings of fact has been described as "arrogance of ap-
pellate courts at their worst."' 03 This criticism is neither construc-
tive nor appropriate. While the courts are not in the business of
making complex decisions about commercial transactions, and
should therefore be hesitant to second-guess decisions of directors,
it is well within the court's competence and responsibility to re-
view both the logic and the evidentiary support for factual deter-
minations made by trial courts. In the Trans Union Case, the su-
preme court exercised appropriate judicial restraint in applying the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review.'04 After finding the court of
chancery's factual determinations were "neither supported by the
record nor the product of an orderly and logical deductive pro-
cess," the court was compelled to reverse."0 5 The judicial deference
engendered by the Business Judgment Rule does not require ap-
pellate courts to accept unsupportable factual findings favorable to
corporate directors.
The criticism of the Trans Union Case has not been limited to
the outcome of the case itself. The paranoia of the business com-
munity over the potential effects of the Trans Union Case has led
to consequences out of proportion to the decision's importance.
'Among the parade of horribles immediately predicted by the cor-
100. See generally Manning, supra note 68, at 5. "It is true that the business judgment
rule applies to all directorial decisions. But the criteria within the rule may later be seen to
vary as a function of the issue at stake." Id. (emphasis omitted).
101. Id.
102. See Borden, First Thoughts on Decision In Delaware on Trans Union, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
103. Herzel, Davis & Coiling, 'Smith' Brings Whip Down on Directors' Backs, Legal
Times, May 13, 1985, at 14, col. 4.
104. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 864.
105. Id. at 885.
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porate Cassandras was an exodus from boardrooms of directors
fearful of liability, an increase in the number of insurers unwilling
to issue directors' and officers' liability policies, and a chilling ef-
fect on managerial risk-taking.10 6 Although some of the conse-
quences prophesied have been reflected in recent corporate
surveys,1 07 this phenomenon is more likely to have been brought on
by the misperception of the decision rather than the decision itself.
Read in the context of the corporate law decisions immediately
preceding and following it, the Trans Union Case does not fore-
shadow a shift in Delaware Business Judgment Rule
jurisprudence."'
Ironically, the Trans Union Case may not have been a Business
Judgment Rule decision at all. Although couched in traditional due
care terms, the broader implication may be that Delaware is un-
willing or unready to replace the anachronistic "legal" model 09 of
corporate governance with the "actual" model 10 which better re-
flects the corporate reality in modern business society. The legal
model, as embodied in the corporate codes of most states, requires
that corporations be managed by a board of directors.1 While the
detached oversight of outside directors 2 may be desirable in the-
ory, their ability effectively to direct the corporation is questiona-
106. As these are the very concerns which led to the creation of the Business Judgment
Rule, it is obvious that critics of the Trans Union Case view the decision as a substantial
erosion of the rule. See generally Borden, supra note 102; Rovner, D & 0 Indemnity: Dis-
crete Contracts Seen as an Option, Legal Times, Nov. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Manning, supra
note 68, at 6; Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1437 (1985); Blaine, Liability Looms for firms' boards, USA Today, Jan. 31, 1986, sec.
b, p. 6.
107. See Blaine, supra note 106.
108. In two cases decided by the Delaware Supreme Court within 11 months of the
Trans Union Case, the court found the Business Judgment Rule to protect decisions by
directors despite serious questions raised about the propriety of the decisions. See Aronson,
473 A.2d at 805; Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (1984). In a subsequent case the court held
that a board of directors' decision adversely affecting the rights of minority shareholders fell
within the rule. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
109. "Legal" model refers to the traditional situation in which directors, as required by
corporate codes, manage the corporation.
110. "Actual" model refers to the apparent corporate reality that, notwithstanding the
literal requirements of state codes, modern large corporations are managed primarily by
corporate officers.
111. For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law states: "The business and af-
fairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorpo-
ration." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974).
112. "Outside" directors are directors who are unaffiliated with the corporation in any
capacity other than as a director.
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ble in practice. Directorships of large corporations are often more
titular than functional, and those who serve in these part-time po-
sitions, frequently do so for numerous corporations.1 3 Although
generally highly qualified, the only regular contact these directors
often have with the corporation is the monthly board meeting;
thus, their capacity for actual decision-making is necessarily de-
pendent on information supplied by the corporate officers who are
managing the entity's daily operations. " Furthermore, the com-
pensation of outside directors, who seldom are large stockholders,
is not tied to the corporate bottom line, thus limiting the incentive
of outside directors to maximize long-term corporate profitabil-
ity.165 Conversely, senior managers often own a great deal of stock
in the firm or have compensation agreements linked to the firm's
performance." 6 The long-term interests of the corporation and so-
ciety in general may be more closely aligned with the personal in-
terests of corporate officers. Considering their part-time status, it
is questionable whether outside directors truly engage in manage-
rial functions and debatable whether they should.
Regardless of any jurisprudential undercurrents, the Trans
Union Case remains a coherent explication of a long-existing, fun-
damental safeguard for corporate management. It is neither a de-
parture from previous Business Judgment Rule holdings nor a har-
binger of judicial activism in the corporate sphere.
Concerns that the Trans Union Case will amount to an "Invest-
ment Banker's Relief Act" ignore the explicit language of the
court's opinion. The court specifically stated: "We do not imply
that an outside valuation study is essential to support an informed
business judgment; nor do we state that fairness opinions by inde-
pendent investment bankers are required as a matter of law.' ' 1 7
The court further noted that insiders, by virtue of their intimate
knowledge of the company's operation, are often in a superior posi-
113. Blaine, supra note 106. It is not unusual for a person to serve on the boards of
directors of 10 or more large corporations. Id.
114. In explaining that inside directors and corporate officers dominate board meetings,
Harold Geneen, former Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of ITT Corp.
stated: "Outside board members.. . sit there and listen; then they go... home and open
the envelopes that contain their fees." Geneen, Why Directors Can't Protect the Sharehold-
ers, FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 1984, at 28.
115. See Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 375, 387-90 (1983).
116. Fischel, supra note 106, at 1442.
117. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 876.
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tion to evaluate the corporation's worth.'" Recognizing the advan-
tageous position of insiders, the court cited Cheff v. Mathes"' for
the proposition that directors are fully protected in their good
faith reliance on reports by corporate officers.1s0 The court empha-
sized that Van Gorkom's twenty-minute presentation did not qual-
ify as a "report" so as to justify good faith reliance by the direc-
tors.1 21 The Trans Union Case should not be read to detract from
the general rule that directors may rely on inside reports. The rul-
ing may appear economically harsh from the perspective of the di-
rectors, but it is doubtful that it will have substantial impact on
board decisions whether to seek presale financial analyses. Most
multimillion dollar corporations either have an internal mechanism
for financial analysis or would obtain an outside opinion as a mat-
ter of course.
The reaction to the Trans Union Case may itself provide evi-
dence that outside directors play a minor role in corporate govern-
ance. The storm of criticism over the decision appears to focus on
the issue of certainty: What must directors do to remain within the
protective umbrella of the Business Judgment Rule?122 Once there
is a consensus on the level of the managerial decision-making pre-
cautions that are necessary, internal corporate management will
ensure the requirements are met. Inasmuch as substantive deci-
sions are virtually immune from attack,'23 corporate responsibility
to shareholders can be assured only by requiring adequate proce-
dural due care in decision-making.
V. CONCLUSION
For all the outcry in corporate circles, the Trans Union Case
does not appear to be outside traditional formulations of the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule. Considering the protection the rule has af-
forded corporate management over the decades, the criticism lev-
eled at the court's unwillingness to extend the rule further seems
highly unjustified. One must wonder if the criticism is directed at
the court rather than at the decision itself. Just as a basketball
coach may, for tactical reasons, "work the officials" over a close
118. Id.
119. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. Ct. 1964).
120. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 876.
121. Id. at 875; see supra note 60.
122. See generally Manning, supra note 68, at 8-14 (establishing a list of director "do's
and don'ts" divined from the Trans Union Case).
123. Id. at 4.
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call, the response of corporate managers may be designed to influ-
ence as well as to disparage.
"[D]irectors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders.' 1 24 To the extent the Business
Judgment Rule operates to protect managers from improvident de-
cisions made in good faith or from unfortunate consequences of
reasonable decisions, it is a desirable device. However, when reli-
ance on the rule leads to the relaxation of fiduciary conscientious-
ness, it must yield to the paramount societal interest in share-
holder protection. Although created to protect the free exercise of
managerial discretion,125 the Business Judgment Rule should not
be placed on a procrustean bed to cover every fact situation involv-
ing managerial decision-making.
The Trans Union Case will likely be neither a landmark deci-
sion nor have any appreciable effect on traditional Business Judg-
ment Rule jurisprudence. The decision should, however, serve to
remind directors that protection under the Business Judgment
Rule does not come free. Criticism of the decision, though mis-
guided, should likewise focus public awareness on the fiduciary du-
ties of business leaders.
Contrary to a popular legal maxim, the Trans Union Case
stands for the proposition that bad facts make good law.
Thomas C. Wagner
124. The Trans Union Case, 488 A.2d at 872.
125. Id.
